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a relatively low level of operating inventories, it 
requires a relatively high level of capital for its real 
estate component. This component often includes 
buildings, operating systems, furniture, and restau-
rant equipment, and this ordinarily involves secur-
ing external financing to acquire these assets.
This article addresses an important question 
regarding the relation between leverage and its 
effect on stock returns of firms in the hospital-
ity sector. The nature of the industry is important 
when studying the leverage return relation. Arditti 
(1967) and Melicher (1974) argued that the true 
nature of leverage return relation can be disclosed 
only by testing this relation within industries. The 
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Introduction
Leverage is a key variable that plays an impor-
tant role on firm performance (Delcoure & Dickens, 
2004; Mandelker & Rhee, 1984). Borde (1998), Gu 
and Kim (2002), H. Kim, Gu, and Mattila (2002), 
W. Kim, Ryan, and Ceschini (2007), and Lee and 
Jang (2007) found that leverage is an important risk 
factor that affects hospitality firms in particular. 
Thus, we examine the relation between leverage 
and stock returns in the hospitality sector, which is 
a sector that is very reliant on external financing.
The hospitality industry is capital intensive. 
Although a hospitality business typically needs 
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excess of the market return if she/he buys a stock and 
holds it for 1 year depending upon its leverage. In 
this sense, CAARs measure the abnormal returns to 
an equity investor that has a trading strategy based on 
the leverage level of a hospitality firm.
We use book leverage, which is a decision made 
by corporate managers and revealed to investors in 
a timely manner by balance sheet announcements 
(Schwartz, 1959). These data are available to inves-
tors at no additional cost, indicating the fragility of 
the hospitality firms, and can be used as the basis of 
a trading strategy. This study is related to  Muradoglu 
and Sivaprasad (2012a), who reported that the rela-
tion between leverage and stock returns is not the 
same across industries as defined by three-digit SIC 
codes. We argue that the analysis of the hospital-
ity sector is important because it is known for its 
reliance on external finance and leverage has been 
used by previous researchers to explore its predict-
ability as a risk factor in determining performance 
using accounting-based measures (W. Kim et al., 
2007; Shin, Hancer, Leong, & Palakurthi, 2010). 
Our analysis is different from theirs as we use a 
market-based measure of performance that is inte-
grated into an investment strategy. Our sample 
includes 11 travel firms, 6 restaurants, 6 hotels, 14 
pubs, and 2 entertainment firms.
Previous work in the hospitality industry is lim-
ited to understanding the riskiness of the industry 
(Jeon et al., 2006; Lee & Jang, 2007). Financial 
leverage is one of the sources of fixed costs due 
to interest payments and induces additional con-
straints on cash flows to shareholders, especially 
when sales levels drop. Irrespective of whether or 
not a company makes a profit, interest must be paid 
to the debt holders (Nicolau, 2005). Skalpe (2003) 
stated that financial leverage is an important fac-
tor in assessing the risk of a firm and its securities. 
Similar to his study, we also use share prices as a 
future-oriented measure of cash flows to the inves-
tor (Horsky & Swyngedouw, 1987; Tarras, 1991). 
Our measure is scaled as abnormal returns to the 
investor. We use leverage as the source of financial 
risk of the firm as our main variable. We consider the 
impact of both market risk and other known sources 
of idiosyncratic risk such as size, book to market, 
and price earnings ratio. Our results are robust to 
the inclusion of Fama and French’s (1993) and 
 Carhart’s (1997) risk factors.
hospitality sector deserves a specific industry-level 
analysis about the relation between leverage and 
financial performance due to their industry-specific 
characteristics such as management contracts in 
hotels and franchising in hotels and restaurants. 
Madanoglu, Lee, and Catrogiovanni (2011), Hsu 
and Jang (2009), Srinivasan (2006), Combs and 
Ketchen (1999), and Alon (2001) found a negative 
relation between leverage and performance when 
they examine the effect of franchising on the finan-
cial performance of restaurants.
The hotel industry is also characterized by the rela-
tionships between owners and operators, arising from 
the growth in hotel management contracts. Thus, this 
separation of ownership and management signifies 
that investment decisions are made with the involve-
ment of two distinct organizations in hotel investment 
decision making (Guilding 2003). Harris and Brander 
Brown (1998) argued that the hotel industry is recog-
nized as high risk by investors and operators alike. 
However, the assessment of investment risk appears 
to be little understood or at least rarely applied in the 
majority of investment decisions.
Harris and Brander Brown (1998) argued that 
besides dividends, the second reward that hotel 
owners would like to see is an increase in the value 
of their investment. He documents that this reward 
is easily measured by hotel companies whose capi-
tal stock is traded on stock exchanges. In this arti-
cle, we address this issue and analyze the relation 
between leverage and stock returns for hospitality 
firms listed in the London Stock Exchange.
Measure of Returns
Work on accounting information and performance 
in the hospitality industry has used profitability as 
a balance sheet-based measure of performance. For 
example, Jeon, Kim, and Lee (2006) used earnings, 
which relate to the clean surplus concept. Lee and 
Jang (2007) used return on assets. We do not use these 
accounting-based measures. Our line of thinking 
considers a stock market investor and thus the use of 
abnormal stock returns would be more appropriate to 
a trader or investor while evaluating and monitoring 
the performance of his investments as opposed to the 
use of balance sheet performance measures. We use 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs). 
CAARs measure the return an investor makes in 
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ratio. Modigliani and Miller showed that the relation 
is positive in the oil and gas and utilities sectors. 
Some authors (Bhandari, 1988; Hamada, 1972) have 
shown that returns increase in leverage; others have 
shown that they decrease in leverage (Baker, 1973; 
Dimitrov & Jain, 2008; Gomes & Schmid, 2010; 
Hall & Weiss, 1967; Korteweg, 2010; Muradoglu & 
Sivaprasad, 2012a, 2012b). Thus, it is evident from 
these studies that leverage can explain returns.
If the analysis is conducted in the cross section 
of all firms, the findings may be misleading due to 
the different capital structures in various industries. 
The results from empirical work thus is inconclusive 
when all firms are analyzed without due reference 
to the industry. The capital structures of financial 
companies such as banks and insurance companies 
are very different from that of nonfinancial firms. 
The interpretation and treatment of leverage in the 
balance sheet of a nonfinancial firm is such that it 
represents the claims of the debt holders. Second, 
the relation between firm leverage and returns can 
differ from one industry to another among nonfi-
nancial firms. Muradoglu and Sivaprasad (2012b) 
reported that abnormal returns decrease in firm 
leverage except in the utilities sector, where abnor-
mal returns increase in firm leverage. This is due to 
the capital-intensive nature of this regulated indus-
try. Likewise, hospitality firms are different from 
other manufacturing firms in many respects. It is 
difficult to assess the relation between leverage and 
stock returns in hospitality firms without consider-
ing their capital-intensive industry characteristics 
and highly seasonal revenue structures.
Leverage and the Hospitality Sector
The main focus of this study is to examine the 
effect of leverage in the stock returns of the hospi-
tality sector. We argue that it is imperative to under-
stand the financing patterns of firms and their effect 
on stock returns in order to effectively manage the 
business. Lee and Jang (2007) examined the sys-
tematic risk in the US airline industry and find that 
effective financial policy is important in managing 
systematic risk. There are a few studies that exam-
ined the effect of leverage in the hospitality sector 
from various aspects (Cave, Gupta, & Locke, 2009; 
Jang & Tang, 2009; H. Kim & Gu, 2005; Lee & 
Jang, 2007; Nicolau, 2005; Phillips and Sipahioglu, 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
effect of firm leverage on stock returns in the 
hospitality sector in the UK. The proposition that 
is explored here is Proposition 2 of Modigliani 
and Miller’s (1958) capital structure theorem. 
 Modigliani and Miller argued that returns increase 
in leverage due to the risk attached to debt. This 
article reports that the highest abnormal returns 
in the hospitality sector are earned by investing in 
medium leverage companies.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides a background to the theory of capital 
structure. In section 3 we describe the rationale 
behind our sample selection procedure, the vari-
ables we use, and the method we apply. We present 
our results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Research Background
Policy makers are always keen to know how the 
positive economic aspects of tourism development 
can lead to income generation, job opportunities, 
government taxes, and foreign exchange earnings in 
an economy. The hospitality sector normally feels the 
effects of a weak economy first. However, as soon as 
the economy takes a turn for the better, consumers 
return, spending increases, and the industry pros-
pers. Since the 2008 crisis, under capital constraints, 
the leverage choices of the hospitality industry have 
gained importance. For example, Thomas Cook, 
Europe’s second largest tour operator, was recently 
in the news for its excessive debt and plunging share 
prices as a result (Wembridge & Blitz, 2011).
H. Kim et al. (2002), Lee and Jang (2007), Borde 
(1998), Gu and Kim (2002), and W. Kim et al. (2007) 
found leverage as a key risk factor in explaining the 
performance of firms in the hotel, airline, and casino 
industries, respectively. In this article, we investi-
gate the relation between leverage and stock returns 
of all hospitality firms listed in the London Stock 
Exchange with operations as hotels, restaurants, 
pubs, travel companies, and entertainment firms.
Theory of Capital Structure
In their seminal work, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) stated that the expected yield of a share is 
equal to the appropriate capitalization rate plus a pre-
mium related to financial risk equal to the debt–equity 
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series and static data on equities, bonds, economies, 
futures, and options. It is operated by Thomson 
Reuters. All listed firms in London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) classified under the hospitality sector were 
selected for the period 1988–2008.
For each firm year observation to enter the sample, 
we had two selection criteria: the study required that 
a fiscal year-end leverage and stock price series be 
available for at least 12 months, and firms with nega-
tive book-to-market ratios were excluded because 
firms with negative book-to-market ratios are not 
meaningful in measuring growth opportunities (Fama 
& French, 1992). Accordingly, our sample includes 
39 companies that are listed at LSE. We began our 
analysis in 1988 as there are no listed hospitality firms 
with full information prior to that period. Firms that 
are listed after this date were added into the database 
if they met the above criteria. Firms that were del-
isted due to various reasons, including mergers and 
acquisitions and bankruptcy, remained in the sample 
until they were delisted from the LSE. Therefore, our 
sample does not have survivorship bias. Hence, all 
firms do not have balance sheet information through-
out the whole research period. Thirteen firms have 
observations for the full research period of 20 years, 
five firms have the minimum data requirement of 2 
years, and other firms have data between 2 and 20 
years with the median firm having data for 20 years. 
The resulting sample contains 464 firm year-end 
observations from 39 hospitality companies during 
the research period from 1988 to 2008.
Firms are ranked each year according to the lever-
age reported in their annual reports with year-end dates 
December 31. We make annual portfolio assignments 
that are based on the leverage of the firms. Each year, 
the firms are divided into three groups based on their 
leverage. The bottom 30% of companies constitutes 
the low leverage group and the top 30% of the com-
panies constitute the high leverage group. The capital 
leverage definition is used to represent the leverage 
of firms in the sample. The leverage of a company 
(expressed as a percentage) represents the total debt 
to total financing of the firm and is defined as:
 
Long-term debt + Short-term debt
Leverage




The book value of leverage is the relevant 
measure of cash flows to the firm over which 
2004; Sheel, 1994; Skalpe, 2003). Sheel (1994) exam-
ined the relation between a firm’s capital structure, 
its cost of capital, and its stock value and found that 
all determinants of leverage affect capital structure 
decision of hospitality firms and shed light on the 
short-term and long-term behavior of hospitality 
firms as opposed to manufacturing firms. On the 
other hand, H. Kim and Gu (2005) found that in 
addition to growth, profitability, and stock perfor-
mance, leverage did not play a role in determining 
CEO compensation in the restaurant industry.
Singh (2009) investigated the relation between 
interest rate derivatives, interest rate exposure, and 
debt maturity structure in a sample of lodging firms 
from 2000 to 2004. The results show that small 
unrated firms are more likely to issue short-term debt 
and swap into fixed-rate debt to reduce exposure to 
interest rate risk. Skalpe (2003) found that the high 
variability in earnings is mainly caused by opera-
tional and financial leverage. He found that the mar-
ket rewards risk but not risk induced by high leverage. 
Jeon, Kang, and Lee (2004) found that although per-
sistence in earnings is higher for the hotel industry 
than in manufacturing companies, hotels do not uti-
lize the accounting information such as leverage. Jeon 
et al. (2006) argued that financial leverage explains 
the systematic risk of firms. Jang and Tang (2009) 
found an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
financial leverage and profitability, implying an opti-
mal leverage pattern for maximum profitability.
Nicolau (2005) argued that operating leverage 
represents the sensitivity of profits to changes in 
sales. Lee and Jang (2007) found that effective 
financial policy helps lower debt in airlines and 
helps them prepare for manage their risk. Hence, 
they concluded that management needs to pay spe-
cial attention to debt ratio in order to reduce sys-
tematic risk of the firm. Phillips and Sipahioglu 
(2004) found no significant relation between the 
levels of debt found in the capital structure of firms 
and financial performance. Based on the discussion 
above, we conclude that leverage is an important 
firm characteristic that can explain the variation of 
stock returns of firms in the hospitality sector.
Data and Method
The data were obtained from DataStream. 
DataStream is a large financial database with time 











































) is the 
variance over t months.
In equation 3 CAR
it
 represents the summation of 
the abnormal returns of each firm i for t, which is 
the 12-month period over which we cumulate the 
returns. Equation 4 represents the CAARs for n 
firms in our sample. Equation 5 gives the t statistic 
test, which is used to measure the statistical signifi-
cance of the CAARs.
The next step is to determine whether CAARs at 
the firm level can be explained by firms’ leverage. 
We also conduct a number of robustness tests. We 
repeat the exercise with subsamples based not only 
on leverage but also on size of the company (SIzE), 
price-to-book ratio (PTBV), price/earnings (P/E), 
and market risk (BETA). We construct portfolios 
from the intersection of the three leverage portfolio 
and three size portfolio assignments. We calculate 
the CAARs for each leverage/size portfolio. Simi-
larly, we construct portfolios from the intersection 
of leverage and price-to-book ratio, leverage and 
price/earnings, and leverage and market risk and 
leverage portfolios.
The article also estimates equation 6 below first 
in the full sample. In equations 7 and 8, the estima-
































































Equation 6 aims to examine the effect of lever-
age as the only explanatory variable on the CAARs 
management has discretion in making decisions 
regarding capital structure (Bowman, 1980; Rajan 
& zingales, 1995; Schwartz, 1959). Schwartz 
(1959) argues that using market-based measure-
ments of leverage ignores the cash flows that the 
firm receives at the time of capital structure deci-
sion. This study bases the analysis on the same 
belief. The difference between the book and market 
equity is accounted for by using price-to-book ratio 
as a risk factor (Fama & French, 1992). Firm size 
is represented by a firm’s market value defined as 
the closing share price multiplied by the number of 
ordinary shares in issue. The price-to-book value 
refers to a firm’s closing share price divided by the 
book value. The price/earnings ratio refers to the 
ratio of price to earnings. The market risk measure 
is the beta coefficient (β), which is estimated over 
a 5-year period in a rolling window, using monthly 
data. The impact of market conditions on capital 
structure is also taken into account by examining 
interest rates. Interest rate is the average monthly 
Bank of England (BoE) rate that is observed over 
the 1-year period.
The stock returns for each company are esti-
mated monthly, using the percentage change in 
consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, 
splits, and rights issues (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & 
Roll, 1969). We measure abnormal returns using the 
market model. Practitioners prefer this as it is intui-
tive and easy to compute. It also has the additional 
econometric advantage of reducing the variance 
of abnormal returns, which leads to an increased 
ability to detect the outcome (Campbell, Lo, & 
MacKinlay, 1997). Abnormal returns are expressed 










 is the monthly return of the share i on 
day t; and E(R
i,t
) is the expected return on stock i 
in month t, which is represented by the return on 
FTSE All-Share index.
Next the cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) on portfolios are estimated starting on 
May 1 each year. CAARs are calculated for the 12 
months following the period of portfolio formation 
and use t tests (Brown & Warner, 1980; Campbell 
et al., 1997) for differences from zero, using the 
following equations:
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is meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related 
to size (Fama & French, 1993). The portfolio 
MOMENTS (high minus low) is meant to mimic 
the risk factor in returns related to momentum 
( Carhart, 1997). It is the difference each month 
between the simple average of the returns on the 
three high returns portfolios and the average of the 
returns on the three low returns portfolios. Thus, 
MOMENTS is the difference between the returns 
of the high and low returns stock portfolios.
Empirical Findings
The main aim of the study is to examine the effect 
of leverage on stock returns of hospitality firms. 
First, we rank the firms each year according to 
the leverage reported in their annual reports with 
year-end dates December 31. We then make annual 
portfolio assignments that are based on the lever-
age of the firm. We calculate abnormal returns for 
each leverage portfolio and test whether they are 
different from zero. We also conduct a number of 
robustness tests by repeating the exercise with sub-
samples based not only on leverage but also on size 
of the company (SIzE), price-to-book ratio (PTBV), 
price/earnings (P/E), and market risk (BETA). We 
also undertaken regressions using two-stage least 
squares and GMM.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the 
six variables: CAARs, leverage, size, price-to-book, 
price/earnings ratio, risk, and, interest rates. The 
sample’s mean and the median CAARs are 0.37% 
and 0.51%, respectively. The distribution is dis-
persed with a standard deviation of 2.97% and a 
range between −13.04% and 10.19%. At 32.08% 
and 32.16%, respectively, the mean and median of 
the leverage are quite close. The standard deviation 
is 20.71%, with a range between 0% and 97.61%. 
The JB statistic indicates that there is nonnormality 
in the data set.
Leverage and Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns
Table 2 represents the CAARs for leverage port-
folios. Leverage group 1 (low) contains firms with 
of firms. Stock returns can be influenced by other 
variables. We add those to the right-hand side of 
the regression equation to test the robustness of our 
results. In equation 7, we add other firm charac-
teristics such as size, market risk, price-to-book, 
price/earnings, and a macroeconomic variable 
the interest rates as further determinants of stock 
returns. Considering that the firms might want to 
maintain an optimal capital structure, we use a 
two-stage least squares estimation method whereby 
we first predict the optimal capital structure using 
these variables and then use the predicted values of 
leverage as a determinant of abnormal returns. We 
conduct alternative estimations in panel using Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators 
with whitening in the cross section [we repeat the 
estimations using OLS panel estimators. Results 
(not reported here) do not alter conclusions]. GMM 
estimators ensure that no assumptions are made 
about the variables’ distributional properties, and 
take into account the dynamic nature of the relation 
(Campbell et al., 1997). We use firm fixed effects 
following Flannery and Rangan (2006) so as to 
account for the richness of firm-specific informa-
tion [we repeat the estimations with random effects 
for the full sample and all subsamples, as well as 
industry fixed effects for the full sample. Results 
(not reported here) do not alter our conclusions].
It is well documented that the two factors of 
Fama and French (namely, SMB for size and HML 
for distress) and Carhart’s momentum factors have 
an important influence on variation in stock returns. 
Thus, as our second robustness test we examine 
these three additional factors when estimating the 
relation between leverage and stock returns of the 
hospitality firms.
Equation 8 presents the relation between stock 
returns and leverage controlling for Fama-French 
and Carhart factors, where R
t
 is the monthly stock 
returns in excess of the risk-free rate in month t. 
The risk-free rate is the 1-month UK Treasury dis-
count bill. The α stands for constant, leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to total equity plus debt, SMB 
(small minus big) is the size-mimicking portfolio, 
HML is the price-to-book-mimicking portfolio, 
and MOMENTS is the momentum-mimicking port-
folio. SMB is the average return on three small 
portfolios minus the average return on three big 
portfolios. The portfolio SMB (small minus big) 
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as risk increases. Firms in the highest risk group 
and the medium levered firms earn excess returns 
of 0.72% while companies in the highest market 
risk and highest leverage group earn abnormal 
returns of 0.10%. Firms with high risk coefficients 
and low leverage levels earn abnormal returns of 
up to 0.73% while firms with low risk coefficients 
and high leverage earn abnormal returns as low 
as 0.60%. Firms with low market risk earn posi-
tive abnormal returns in most leverage levels, with 
higher abnormal returns for lower and medium 
debt levels.
Leverage and Size Sorted Portfolios
Table 4 reports CAARs of portfolios based on 
leverage and size. Abnormal returns decrease as 
firm size increases. Smallest firms earn a return 
the lowest leverage; leverage group 2 (medium) 
consists of firms with medium leverage, whereas 
leverage group 3 (high) consists of firms with the 
highest leverage. Group 1 has an average lever-
age of 9.26%, group 2 has an average leverage of 
31.59%, and in group 3 the leverage increases to 
55.57%. Firms in the lowest group (low levered 
firms) earn CAARs of 0.36%, which are not sig-
nificantly different from zero, the medium levered 
firms in group 2 earn 0.53%, and the highly levered 
firms in group 3 earn CAARs of 0.22%.
Leverage and Risk Sorted Portfolios
Table 3 reports CAARs for portfolios based on 












Mean 0.37 32.08 17.87 2.44 829.49 6.72 0.82
Median 0.51 32.16 15.45 1.39 167.27 5.92 0.76
Max 10.19 97.61 87.00 11.6 916.07 15.25 2.83
Min −13.05 0 0 0.20 7.44 3.71 −0.63
SD 2.98 20.71 11.25 6.10 14.87 2.94 15.52
JB statistic 94.93 11.37 61.89 13.8 16.79 23.33 30.86
Summary statistics for our sample. We have a total of 464 year-end observations for a sample of 39 com-
panies for the period 1988–2008. CAARs are returns accumulated from May of year t over a 1-year period. 
Leverage represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). The market 
value of firms represents the size factor. The price/earnings is the price divided by the earnings per share 
and is as of the beginning of May of year t. The price-to-book of firms is the share prices of firms divided 
by the net book value and is as of the beginning of May of year t. The market risk measure is the beta coef-
ficient estimated over 5 years using monthly data and is as of the beginning of May of year t.
Table 2
Leverage and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARs)




The 12-month holding period average leverage and CAARs 
for each leverage group for the full sample during 1988–
2008. Leverage represents the total debt to total financing 
of the firm. We make portfolio assignments yearly from the 
beginning of May in year t to the end of April of year t + 1. 
Low represents the firms with the lowest leverage, Medium 
represents firms with medium leverage, and High represents 
firms with the highest leverage. Column 2 shows the average 
leverage for each group. Column 3 shows the average cumu-











Low risk 0.12* 0.05* 0.60* 0.25
Medium risk 0.46* 0.63* 0.02 0.35
High risk 0.73* 0.72* 0.10* 0.51
Grand total 0.36 0.53 0.22 0.37
The results of the portfolios based on leverage and betas 
for 1988–2008. The market risk measure is the beta coef-
ficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data and is 
as of the beginning of May of year t. We subdivide each 
leverage group into three risk sorted portfolios. *1% sig-
nificance level.
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Leverage and Price/Earnings Sorted Portfolios
Table 6 presents CAARs earned by portfolios 
formed on the basis of leverage and price/earnings 
(P/E). The results indicate that CAARs decrease as 
P/E increases. This result is in line with earlier stud-
ies where value stocks (with low P/E) outperform 
growth stocks (with high P/E) as value stocks offer 
a safe long-term investment. Companies in the low-
est leverage and P/E group overperform the market 
with CAARs of 0.89%, firms with medium lever-
age and low P/E earn 0.78%, while firms with high-
est leverage and low P/E earn CAARs of 0.50%. 
For firms with highest leverage, CAARs decrease 
as P/E increases from low to high.
Regression Results
Table 7 reports the results of the two-stage least 
squares regressions for the full sample. In stage one 
we estimate the optimal capital structure using inter-
est rates and firm-specific determinants as indepen-
dent variables. In stage two we use the predicted 
values of optimal capital structure as the indepen-
dent variable. We use firm level fixed effects, and 
coefficients for fixed effects are significant in all 
estimations. For the overall sample, two-stage least 
squares regressions reveal a negative and signifi-
cant relationship between leverage and cumulative 
abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns 
decline in leverage. A 1% increase in leverage is 
associated with a 0.01% decline in CAARs. The 
negative and significant coefficient on interest rates 
indicates CAARs are higher during periods of low 
interest rates. Although we account for the effect 
of 0.28%, medium-sized firms earn 0.53%, and 
the largest firms earn 0.31%. Small firms with 
medium leverage earn abnormal returns of 0.10% 
while small firms with high leverage earn returns 
of 0.25%. For medium levered firms, CAARs 
range from 0.10% to 0.68% as size increases small 
to big.
Leverage and Price-to-Book Sorted Portfolios
Table 5 presents the CAARs for portfolios based 
on leverage and price-to-book value (PTBV). Across 
all the leverage groups, CAARs increase with 
increase in PTBV in the low and medium levered 
firms. Firms with medium leverage and high PTBV 
earn 0.91%. Firms in the highest leverage and PTBV 
groups have abnormal returns not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Firms with low leverage and high 
PTBV earn 0.82% CAARs while firms with high 











Small 0.44* 0.10* 0.25* 0.28
Medium 0.60* 0.81* 0.13* 0.53
Big –0.83* 0.68* 0.26* 0.31
Grand Total 0.44 0.49 0.36 0.37
The results of the portfolios based on leverage and size for 
1988–2008. Market value of companies represents the size 
factor of firms. Each leverage group is subdivided into three 











Low PTBV –0.01 0.30* 1.12* 0.30
Medium PTBV 0.64* 0.42* 0.01 0.32
High PTBV 0.82* 0.91* 0.04 0.51
Grand Total 0.36 0.53 0.22 0.37
The results of the portfolios based on leverage and price-
to-book ratio for 1988–2008. Each leverage group is subdi-
vided into three price-to-book ratio portfolios (PTBV). *1% 
significance level.
Table 6









Low P/E 0.89* 0.78* 0.50* 0.70
Medium P/E 0.15* 0.61* –0.27* 0.18
High P/E 0.04 0.31* 0.33* 0.24
Grand Total 0.36 0.53 0.22 0.37
The results of the portfolios based on leverage and price/
earnings (P/E) ratio for 1988–2008. The P/E ratio is the 
share prices of companies divided by the earnings per share. 
We subdivide each leverage group into three price-earnings 
ratio portfolios. *1% significance level.
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and Carhart’s portfolio-mimicking risk factors, the 
negative effect of leverage on CAARs remains neg-
ative and significant.
In this section, our results indicate that that it is 
possible to earn abnormal returns up to 0.53% by 
investing in hospitality firms with medium lever-
age. If investors were to invest in a portfolio of 
medium leverage and high risk it would yield inves-
tors a return of 0.72%; a portfolio of medium lever-
age and medium sized firms would yield a return of 
0.81%. From the regression results, we also show 
that, regardless of the risk adjustments we make, 
of several idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk 
factors, the negative effect of leverage on CAARs 
remains significant.
Table 7 also reports the regression results of 
GMM regressions for the full sample. We find that 
CAARs decline in leverage. For every 1% increase 
in leverage, CAARs will fall by 0.02%. The nega-
tive and significant coefficient on interest rates and 
size indicates CAARs are higher during periods 
of low interest rates. Although we account for the 
effect of several idiosyncratic and macroeconomic 
risk factors, the negative effect of leverage on 
CAARs remains significant.
Table 8 reports results for equation 8 using two-
stage least squares when we include the Fama-
French and Carhart risk factors. We find that returns 
fall by 0.03% for every 1% increase in leverage. 
The negative coefficient for SMB indicates that 
CAARs are higher for big firms and the positive 
and significant coefficient for HML indicates that 
returns are higher for high book-to-market firms.
Table 8 also reports the empirical results of equa-
tion 8 in the full sample when we include portfolio-
mimicking risk factors in the regression model as 
control variables using GMM estimators. We find 
that returns fall by 0.03% for every 1% increase in 
leverage. The negative and significant coefficient 
on SMB indicates CAARs are higher for big firms 
and the positive coefficient on HML indicates that 
CAARs are higher for high book-to-market firms. 
Although we account for the effects of Fama-French 
Table 7

















































Our cross-sectional regression results on cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and leverage, 
size, price-to-book ratios, price/earnings ratios, risk (beta), and interest rates. The sample comprises 464 
observations of 39 companies for the period 1988–2008. Interest rates are as of the beginning of May of 
year t to the end of April of year t +1 and are averaged over the 12-month period. We use two-stage least 
squares and panel regression with GMM estimators and fixed effects for time with whitening in the period. 
We report t statistics for all coefficient estimates in parentheses.
Table 8
Regression Results for Firm Leverage and Fama-French 
plus Carhart Factors
Overall 































Our regression results on stock returns and leverage, Fama-
French and Carhart factor-mimicking portfolios for size 
(SMB), price to book (HML), and momentum (MOMENTS), 
respectively. The sample comprises 7,549 observations of 
39 companies for the period 1988–2008. The t statistics are 
reported in parentheses.
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sector. The financial management of hospitality 
firms may need to identify novel ways of expand-
ing the business without overstretching the levels 
of debt to high leverage in their particular industry. 
Also, this finding can be particularly useful for an 
astute hospitality investor who is able to accurately 
predict the economic fluctuations, and know when 
to buy and sell hospitality assets.
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